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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PAGE ELECTRIC SERVICE, INC.,
a corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 93-0328-CA

THE OHIO CASUALTY GROUP
OF INSURANCE COMPANIES,
a Corporation,

Priority No. 15

Defendant-Appellant.
JURISDICTION
The

Utah

Court

of

Appeals

has

jurisdiction

as

a case

transferred from the Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case,

Plaintiff ("Page"), subcontractor, brought suit against the
bonding company of the general contractor ("Ohio Casualty") for
balances due on three construction projects.
B.

Course of Proceedings,

After a bench trial, the court made findings and entered
judgment against Ohio Casualty for an amount less than that
claimed by Page.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Page agrees with part of the statement of facts in Ohio
Casualty's brief, and disputes or supplements the statements
1

using the same paragraph numbers and headings.
1.

Glendon's Subcontracts with Page Electric.

Page responded to Glendon's request for proposal for
electrical work on the construction of a smaller Autozone store
at Bountiful, and larger store at Murray and Orem, Utah by
unsigned letter dated April 16, 1990 addressed to Glendon which
stated:
"PROPOSAL: Auto Zone
Dear Ted,
Install electrical to small building
$7190.00
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch
gear
Install electrical to large building
$9420.00
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch
gear
If we can be of further help, please call. Thanks for
the opportunity."
The proposed total for the three jobs was $26,030.00. (P.Ex.1).
The trial court stated in findings from the bench that
Glendon received the proposals, and responded that Page was the
low bidder and that all parties contemplated that there would be
some change orders during construction.

The trial court also

stated that Page commenced work at Bountiful on August 30, and
performed the last work on October 29, 1990; commenced at Murray
on September 5, and performed the last work on December 3, 1990;
and commenced at Orem on September 4, and performed the last work
on December 4, 1990. (R35).

As to the existence of a contract

the court stated:
There was never any written agreement between
plaintiffs and Glendon Corporation. However,
clear that these parties had a meeting of the
least as to the basic contract price and what
2

the
it's
mind at
was to be

paid in that regard, and they further agreed that there
would be changes and that those would be expected to be
carried out by these plaintiffs. It's unclear what the
agreement was between the parties on how that was to be
conducted. (R36,69).
Paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the court's Findings of Fact (R6769) are to the effect that the bid proposal, its acceptance by
Glendon and the performance thereunder constituted the contracts
between the parties and there was no formal subcontract signed by
either party.

The green "Subcontract Agreement" (D.Ex.ll) was

sent to Page but was never signed by either party because of some
difference between that agreement and the bid (R246).
The court analyzed the performance including change orders,
allowed some change orders, disallowed others and deducted for
items not performed, and then made a finding of the reasonable
value of the performance of the bid as follows:
"A summary of charges and credits on the three stores is as
follows:
Bountiful Stores:
Reasonable value of performance of bid
Less heat tape.
Net
Murray Store:
Reasonable value of performance of bid
Power to Yard lights $1,380.00 less $316.00
Extra roof top unit
Rerouting conduit to sign
Repairs to defective lighting

$6,298.70
$9,420.00
1,064.00
670.00
153.00
338.47

Deduction

$1, 331.30

Net

$10,428.47

Orem Store:
Reasonable value of performance of bid
Extra roof top unit
3

$7,190.00
-891.30

$9,420.00
670.00

Repairs to defective lighting

338.47
$10,428.47

Less credit to Glendon:
Heating tape $891.30
Uncompleted work $215.00
Total amount due Plaintiff:

Net
$25,935.04

-1,106.30
$9,322.17

11. The plaintiff has not been paid any amount
other than reimbursement for the temporary power. The
part payment by checks reciting payment in full were
properly refused by the plaintiff, and the lien waivers
were without consideration and of no effect.
12. The Court finds that the defendant surety
agreed to indemnify and pay over on behalf of Glendon
any sums due and owing pursuant to the contracts which
were not paid by Glendon but not exceeding the contract
amounts. The Court finds that the additions agreed to
by the parties are included as contracts amounts. (R7071) .
Glendon7s employee, Cromer, testified that Page's charges were a
"good value".
2.

Liquidated Damages and Additional Damages

Glendon quoted from the "prime contract" between Glendon and
Autozone as providing for a $300.00 per day liquidated damages
for late completion.

No copy of the prime contract was provided

to Page who received only those sheets of the plans relating to
electrical work (R213).
Page objected to admission of evidence regarding the
liquidated damages assessed against Glendon for the reason that
Page did not sign any agreement relating to liquidated damages
(R333).

However, the court overruled the objection and received

the documents because "The Court finds it goes to notice."
(R334).

At the close of the trial the court stated in its bench
4

findings:
The Court finds that these plaintiffs were aware
of the penalty which was in effect on these particular
stores and liquidated damages which could be imposed.
However, in light of the extras that were charged
relative to the Murray store, there is no indication
that the extra days were in fact used in doing those
extras or in some other way, and therefore the Court
denies any liquidated damages apportioned to these
plaintiffs in this particular case.
There was no evidence that Page caused any delays.

Glendon's

employee, Lefler said they determined how many days Page was
given to do the job compared to the number of days on the job and
assessed the difference as "delay days." (R336).

However, on

cross examination, Lefler could not specify any delays, he just
knew that Page was scheduled for nine days on the Murray job and
was there twenty-one days

He admitted that realistically Page

could not work nine days straight because of having to coordinate
with the progress of other subcontractors (R362), and Lefler did
not know of any instance where Page failed to perform timely with
respect to other subcontractors (R363).
3.

Page Electrics Extra Charges for Replacing Damaged or

Defective Ballasts.
There was conflicting evidence as to the charge of $338.47
for defective ballasts supplied by Autozone.

The court resolved

the matter in its bench findings: (R38)
The Court would further find that under the terms
of the contract documents, it was agreed that Autozone
would furnish certain fixtures. Those fixtures
included the lighting fixtures, that any expenditures
made in replacing those that were defective were proper
change orders and those sums should be awarded to the
plaintiff in the amount I believe on the Murray job of
I think it was $338. The Court finds all other items
5

claimed by the plaintiffs in that job were readily
ascertainable from the contract documents.
4.

Glendon/s Tender of Payment to Page Electric.

The three checks issued by Glendon to Page were less than
the amount invoiced (R398) and each check stub recited a 10%
retainage.

Glen Adams, president of Glendon, admitted that the

three checks were based upon an October 25th billing and not the
larger November 7th billing, and that the checks were dated
December 10, 1990. He did not contact Page to advise that they
could alter the endorsement and cash the checks.

No other checks

were issued and Glendon had the use of the money all of that time
(R285-286).
5.

Rulings by the Trial Court.

The rulings of the trial court are better stated by the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached to the
Appellant's brief and contained in the record (R66-72) and the
bench ruling (R32-46).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

PREJUDGMENT INTEREST

Prejudgment interest was properly awarded by the court in
this action on contract for services and materials in building
construction projects since the amount was calculated with
mathematical accuracy on items found to have been performed.
There was no unconditional tender of full payment which would
interrupt the running of interest and all offers of payment were
less than payment in full.
II,

BONDING COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST.
6

Whenever a penalty on a bond becomes a debt due and payable,
the surety is as much liable for interest thereon as if the
surety had been the original debtor.
III.

THERE WAS NO SIGNED WRITTEN CONTRACT.

Ohio Casualty's claim that Page was bound by the provisions
of a "green" Subcontract Agreement was resolved by the court's
finding that no such agreement was ever signed by either party.
The parties acted upon a bid proposal and its informal
acceptance, which formed the basis of the court's findings as to
performance and entitlement to compensation.
IV.

NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THESE PARTIES

CONTAINED A CLAUSE FOR LIQUIDATED DAMAGES.
There was no signed agreement between Page as subcontractor
and Glendon as general contractor for liquidated damages penalty
for delays of performance.

The court found no evidence that Page

caused any delays or agreed to liquidated damages.

Page

performed all work within a three month term specified in
unsigned documents.
V.

THE AMOUNT OF JUDGMENT WAS
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.

The findings of the court as to amounts due came after a
review of the evidence wherein Page claimed more to be due and
Ohio Casualty claimed less to be due than found by the court.
Ohio Casualty does not marshal1 the evidence to show that the
court's findings were clearly erroneous.
VI.

NO OBJECTION WAS RAISED TO THE C O U R T S
7

REQUEST THAT COUNSEL FORGO CLOSING ARGUMENTS.
Ohio Casualty interrupted the court's bench recitation of
finding to interject expressions as to certain items of the
award.

At the close of the court's presentation, parties were

asked by the court if there were matters which the court had not
resolved, to which Ohio Casualty's counsel responded "None that I
can think of right now, your Honor."

Ohio Casualty also utilized

several post trial proceedings to further advise the court of its
arguments.

In a nonjury trial, the granting or denial of closing

argument is within the discretion of the trial court.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST ALTHOUGH PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD HAVE
COMMENCED AT AN EARLIER DATE THAN AWARDED.
The court found that "[t]he three jobs were substantially
completed by the early part of December, although the Bountiful
store was substantially completed October 29th so far as the
plaintiff was concerned." (R69).

However, the court allowed

interest only from the following January 21, 1991.

The Supreme

Court of Utah in the case of Jorgensen v. John Clary Co. 660 P.2d
229 (Utah 1983) at page 233 held:
INTEREST
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in a case where
the loss is fixed as of a particular time and the
amount of the loss can be calculated with mathematical
accuracy.
Buyer's argument that this is not such a case is
unpersuasive. This is not an instance such as a case
involving personal injury, false imprisonment, wrongful
death, defamation, or the like. Regardless of
variability of the weight of the sheep, these damages
8

were mathematically calculated. The jury awarded
seller damages based upon the difference between what
seller should have received under the contract with
buyer and what he actually received from R.H. Rock
Company as of the date of last delivery. Seller was
entitled to interest on that difference. We find no
error on this point.
citations omitted.
The three checks issued by Glendon dated December 10, 1990,
were for amounts invoiced on October 25, 1990, less 10%
retainage, whereas a full payment would have required the amounts
billed on November 7, 1990, which were substantially larger
amounts (R398).

Glendon did not advise Page to alter the

endorsement which would have acknowledged payment in full and did
not unconditionally subsequently offer payment of any kind until
litigation commenced

By Offer of Judgment dated December 31,

1991, Ohio Casualty offered to allow judgment to be taken against
it by Page in the amount of $22,243.33 with costs accrued to date
(Rll) and a subsequent Offer of Judgment dated May 26, 1992, in
the amount of $25,000.00. No funds were ever deposited in court.
The court made specific findings on the claimed tender.
The Court finds that no payments were made on
these jobs until the middle of December of 1990,
although prior billings had been made to the defendant
—excuse me, to the Glendon Corporation, that at that
time there had arisen between the parties a dispute as
to whether in fact, at least in plaintiffs' mind, they
were going to be paid. The check submitted to them
clearly provided for a release of lien of all sums due
and owing up to a certain date. The Court finds that
the plaintiffs had good reason at that point to send
those checks back, that Glendon Corporation made no
effort to contact the plaintiffs from the plaintiff's
statement, although there is a conflict in testimony,
and to work out those payments and the release of lien
provisions. The Court finds that any release of liens
which were granted by Mr. Merlin Page in this matter
9

were granted in consideration of payment and since no
payment was forthcoming were without consideration.
(R41).
The blanks left in the stamped form of endorsement were more
appropriately to be filled in by the maker of the check and not
entrusted to the payee to choose whatever date the payee selected
and if left blank would lead to more uncertainty and ambiguity as
to what was being released.
The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of Seiverts v.
White, 2 Utah 2d 351, 273 P.2d 974, 978 (1954) that:
A tender, to be good, must be free from any condition
which the tenderer does not have a right to insist
upon. The plaintiffs here had no right to insist upon
delivery of a deed as a condition to their making a
tender of the purchase price.
A tender must be made in good faith and in such a
manner as to most likely, under the circumstances,
benefit the creditor. In this case plaintiffs insisted
upon the defendants meeting their convenience by coming
to their office to receive a tender of a check which
had insufficient funds to cover it."
citations omitted.
At no time did Glendon tender the full amount due.

Glendon had

in its possession three Subcontractor's Release of Lien,
Defendant's Exhibits 22, 23 and 24 dated 11-12-90, signed by
Merlin W. Page and notarized, which recited under oath that "Page
Electric has completed all the work and furnished materials
necessary" for the Autozone stores, which releases were presented
as a condition to payment.

Glendon had these releases in its

possession at the time the three checks were issued which
required a full payment and release of lien endorsement.
In view of the disputed amounts due, change orders,
10

retention of 10% and no clarification of the date which was to be
filled in on the endorsement, Page was justly apprehensive of the
endorsement which could be construed as a final release,
particularly once Glendon did not return the lien waivers and as
shown by later offers, never intended to honor the invoices.
Glen Adams testified that his employee, Steven Broadhead,
related to him that Steve and Merlin Page had discussions over
the three checks and they "blatantly refused them" (R400).

Each

of the three checks, Defendant's Exhibits 22, 23 and 24 are
stamped on the face thereof as having been received back by
Glendon, February 7, 1991. The evidence supports the court's
findings, and the defendant has not marshalled the evidence to
refute the findings.

As stated by the Supreme Court in Scharf v.

BMG Corp. 700 P.2d 1068, (Utah 1985):
To mount a successful attack on the trial court's
findings of fact, an appellant must marshal all the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and
then demonstrate that even viewing it in the light most
favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings. Erickson has not
begun to carry that heavy burden. Nowhere does he
marshal the evidence supporting his version of the
facts, much less the evidence supporting the trial
court's findings. Under these circumstances, we
decline to further consider Erickson's attack on the
factual findings.
citations omitted.
On review, the appellate court is not limited to the written
findings and may properly examine findings expressed from the
bench or contained in other court documents or memoranda.
Merriam v. Merriam 799 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Utah Ct. App 1990).

11

II. OHIO CASUALTY IS EQUALLY LIABLE FOR PREJUDGMENT
INTEREST AS GLENDON.
Utah Code Annotated § 14-2-1 relating to bonds required on
private contract provides in part:
§ 14-2-1(3)
The payment bond shall be with a surety or sureties
satisfactory to the owner for the protection of all
persons supplying labor, services, equipment, or
material in the prosecution of the work provided for in
the contract in a sum equal to the contract price.
§ 14-2-1(4)
A person shall have a right of action on a payment
bond under this chapter for any unpaid amount due him
if:
(a) he has furnished labor, services, equipment,
or material in the prosecution of the work provided for
the contract for which the payment bond is furnished
under this chapter; and
(b) he has not been paid in full within 90 days
after the last day on which he performed the labor or
service or supplied the equipment or material for which
the claim is made.
If Ohio Casualty had paid the contract price when due, there
would not have been any interest charged.

The obligation of a

surety to pay interest is stated in 74 Am. Jur. 2d 116,
Suretyship Section 116:
§ 166. Interest.
Whenever the penalty on a bond becomes a debt due and
payable as to the surety, he is as much liable for
interest thereon as if he had been originally the
principal debtor, not, however, as a part of the debt
for which he become responsible, but as damages for its
detention, and it is immaterial that the allowance of
interest may make the judgment in excess of the penalty
named in the bond. Under this rule, when the bond is
breached, the penalty to the amount of the damages
immediately becomes the debt of the surety and bears
interest the same as any other debt on contract, if the
principal claim bears interest. This has been said to
be the rule irrespective of the fact that no demand was
made on the surety, and regardless of the fact that the
surety had no notice of the principal's default.
12

Evidence was presented that the bonding company responded to
Page's previous correspondence relative to payment by a letter
from Ohio Casualty dated April 24, 1991 (R256-257).
III.

THE ONLY WRITTEN-SIGNED CONTRACT WAS THE BID PROPOSAL.

Ohio refers to its Exhibit 21 attached to its brief as
Addendum "E" as being a binding enforceable contract.

However,

the exhibit, entitled Subcontractor Pre-Qualification Form, is
primarily instructional and states that "The acceptance by
Glendon Corporation for this quotation shall create a binding and
enforceable Contract of Sale, dating from the time of said
acceptance . . . ."

The proposal which Glendon accepted from

Page is Plaintiff's Exhibit #1 which was unsigned and stated:
April 16, 1990
Glendon Corporation
450 East 1000 North
North Salt Lake, Utah

84054

PROPOSAL:

Auto Zone

Dear Ted,
Install electrical to small building
$7190.00
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch
gear
Install electrical to large building
$9420.00
Owner to furnish all fixtures, lamps and switch
gear
If we can be of further help, please call. Thanks for
the opportunity.
The above proposal was accepted by Glendon by exhibits #4 and #5
which are not signed and make no mention of the "green"
Subcontract Agreement, Exhibit #11 which shows a date of June 20,
1990, and was never signed by either party.

There was no mention

of change orders or penalties for delays in the proposal, the
13

acceptance nor the pre-qualification form, and while such matters
were included in part in the "green" Subcontract Agreement, the
latter was never signed nor in existence at the time of the
proposal and acceptance.

The trial court's finding contained in

paragraph 10 that "[t]here was never any written agreement
between plaintiff and Glendon Corporation" is fully supported by
the evidence.
IV. THERE WAS NO LIQUIDATED DAMAGE CLAUSE IN ANY
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY EITHER PARTY.
As reviewed above, the only document signed by Page was the
Subcontractor Pre-Qualification Form (Defendant's Exhibit #21),
which makes no mention of time of performance.

The acceptance of

the Page proposal by Glendon, Defendant's Ex. #5, makes a
reference to time as follows:

"Length of Duration 3 months to

your schedule."
The court found that Page supplied the first labor and
materials on the Bountiful store on August 30, 1990 and the last
work on October 29, 1990 and found the first work on the Murray
store to be September 5, 1990, and the last on December 4, 1990,
and that the three jobs were substantially completed by the early
part of December.

Accordingly the performance by Page was within

the three month "Length of Duration."

There was no evidence that

Page caused any delays in the progress of the construction.
V. THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORTED THE AMOUNT OF THE JUDGMENT
AND MORE.
There was evidence supporting each item of award.

Ohio

Casualty acknowledges in its brief that there was such evidence
14

but contends the dispute should have been resolved in its favor.
"Findings of Fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibilities of the witness."
52(a).

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

A finding is clearly erroneous if it is against the great

weight of the evidence or if the court is otherwise definitely
and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
Page contends that its judgment should have been greater in
that the court allowed deductions of $2,673.90 for heating tapes
claimed by Page to be extras; refused to allow an extra charge of
$418.66 for extending a conduit for a telephone line; and should
have allowed the extra charge of $271.44 for extra elbows and
installation.
VI. NO OBJECTION WAS RAISED TO THE COURT'S REQUEST
THAT COUNSEL FORGO CLOSING ARGUMENTS.
After both parties had rested, and late on the second day of
trial, the court stated:

"Well, in light of the hour, Counsel, I

am going to ask you to forgo closing arguments and I will rule on
the matter for you so you can have it resolved." (R435).
objection was raised by counsel for either party.

No

During the

course of the court's bench findings, Mr. Griffin interrupted the
court on the matter of the heat tapes and temporary power items
(R441) then at record reflects at R-444 the following closing
comments:
15

Mr. Fadel, you are to prepare findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with my ruling. You
are to submit the same to Mr. Griffin at least five
days before they are submitted to me for signature.
Are there any matters that I should have resolved
which I have not, Mr. Fadel, that you are aware of?
MR. FADEL: I think not, your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Griffin, any that you can think of
that I have not resolved?
MR. GRIFFIN: None that I can think of right nowf
your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, If there is a problem, get
on a conference call, either one of you, with the Court
and we will resolve those for you. Let's make sure we
have got all of the exhibits in this matter.
When Mr. Griffin stated that there were no items he could
think of at the time that were not resolved, he effectively
waived any additional argument.
1992.

The trial concluded on June 10,

On June 25, 1992, Glendon filed a Notice of Objections to

Findings, Conclusions, Judgment and Attorney Fee Affidavit (R4550).

The clerk sent a notice setting the matter for oral

argument on July 21, 1992 (R58).

Counsel for both parties

appeared on July 21, 1992 at which time the court reduced the
attorney fee award and the minute entry further states, "Findings
and Order are to be corrected as outlined by the Court.

If there

are objections a conference call is to be made to the Court."
(R62).
On August 14, 1992, Ohio Casualty filed Motion to Amend
Findings and Judgment Or, In the Alternative, For a New Trial
(R757) together with a Memorandum In Support of The Motion To
Amend Findings And Judgment Or, In The Alternative, For a New
Trial (R77-83) wherein Ohio Casualty fully detailed its
arguments.

On August 31, 1992, Ohio Casualty filed a four page
16

"Defendant's Reply Memorandum" (R95-98).

Page filed a Notice To

Submit For Decision on January 19, 1993 (R100).

The court issued

its ruling on Ohio Casualty's motion of August 14, 1992, by the
following Minute Entry dated and signed January 18, 1993:
Comes now the Court and having reviewed
defendant's motion to amend findings and judgment or in
the alternative for a new trial and the memorandum in
support thereof and plaintiff's memorandum in
opposition thereto and the pleadings in the file and
the court's notes of the hearing herein, the Court
hereby denies defendant's motion. The Court finding
that the Findings and Conclusions heretofore made by
the Court are adequately supported by the evidence and
that counsel had adequate time to present their
respective cases during the course of the trial.
Defendant's counsel is to prepare Findings and
Order in accordance with the Court's ruling, submit the
same to opposing counsel at least five days prior to
the time it is submitted to the Court for signature.
Dated this 18th day of January, 1993.
The only case cited by Ohio Casualty on the issue of denial
of closing arguments, DeJohn v. American Estate Life Insurance
Company. 489 P.2d 1065 (Colo. App. 1971) held:
As a third argument, defendant contends that the
trial court erred in refusing to permit it the right to
present argument at the close of the case. This
ruling, it is claimed, denied defendant the right to
present legal argument to the court which might have
swayed its opinion.
We, however, consider this an area of discretion with
the trial court. Defendant was not denied the right to
give the trial court the benefit of its thinking on the
legal theories involved since such arguments were
properly presented in the motion for new trial and were
rejected by the trial court.
Having declined further comment following the court's bench
findings, and persisting in written objections thereafter which
protracted finalization of the judgment for six months, Ohio
Casualty's claim of error in denying closing argument is
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unfounded.
CONCLUSION
Ohio Casualty has been credited with more deductions than
were indicated by the evidence and has taken advantage of liberal
post trial proceedings to expand upon its position.

The judgment

was more than fair to Ohio Casualty.
The judgment should be affirmed and the cause remanded to
the trial court to assess attorney fees on appeal and costs.
DATED this 22nd day of September,
ember, 1993.

X

Gfeorge/K. Fadel
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I mailed two copies of this Reply Brief to Mr. Ronald E.
Griffin, attorney for the appellant, Walker Center, Suite 700,
175 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utj^h, 84111 this 22nd day
of September, 1993.
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PAGE ELECTRIC

***This information must be returned
to Glendon Corporation within 5 days
of receipt
in order to complete
subcontract
agreements and avoid
contract delay* * *
The bid for ........ KJJECIUU^LL
_.___that you submitted to
Glendon Corporation regarding work en the AUTOZONE INC.- Orem Store
project; is fh»* apparent low bid.
We need to receive vital
information for contract documents and project scheduling prior to
the signing of a contract between you and Glendon Corporation.
The enclosed Required Contractor Information form must be filled
out completely and returned to Glendon Corporation offices.
If
this information ha«; already been submitted, you may want to
confirm that the corporate office has 'received it so as not to
del ay yoin" cont raet .
If: you arc required to provide submittals or shop drawings, please
start this process now. This will insure that your phase or phases
ol* the project; are completed in the appropriate time frame arid
without delay to the project.
Glendon Corporation has several project plans.
If your trade
requires it's own set. of plans, please check with our office for
pi r,n avai 1 abi 1 i ty .
in addition to the above mentioned information the following
also necessary to complete the scheduling for the project:
Phase of work
electrical

**N0TF;**

hnlon^ymtion

Length of Duration
IP. 9. n t h s l- o
schedule

is

Days of Delay
(Due to shAppincj etc.)

your
owner furnishing
and f i x t u r e s

a .11 e q u i p n

We (\o not guarantee the above phases and durations are
final.
However, we will do all possible to allow
sufficient time to complete each phase. Exact duration
and phases wi 1 1 be determined upon scheduling completion.

